Non-trivial subgame perfect duopoly equilibria can be supported by continuous reaction functions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(87)90117-0zbMATH Open1328.91215OpenAlexW2022789033MaRDI QIDQ899987FDOQ899987

Larry Samuelson

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(87)90117-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial
• Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly

Cited In (4)

• Punishment strategies in repeated games: evidence from experimental markets
• Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions
• Continuous reaction functions in duopolies
• Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial

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