Backward induction and unacceptable offers
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Publication:462872
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2014.01.013zbMATH Open1308.91066OpenAlexW2072435518MaRDI QIDQ462872FDOQ462872
Authors: Harold Houba, Quan Wen 
Publication date: 22 October 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.013
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Cites Work
- Game theory
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
- Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
- Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
- On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents
- Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining
- A foundation for Markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory
- Bargaining with stochastic disagreement payoffs
- The Condorcet paradox revisited
- Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
- A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
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