Backward induction and unacceptable offers

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2014.01.013MaRDI QIDQ462872zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Harold Houba, Quan Wen

Publication date 22 October 2014

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.013

zbMATH Keywords

delaybargainingnegotiationirrevocable breakdown

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games in extensive form (91A18)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• A foundation for Markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory
• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• Bargaining with stochastic disagreement payoffs
• Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining
• Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
• Game theory
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
• On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The Condorcet paradox revisited

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