Relaxing competition through speculation: committing to a negative supply slope

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.06.004zbMath1330.91174OpenAlexW2106980617MaRDI QIDQ900421

Pär Holmberg, Bert Willems

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1252.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

supply function equilibriumstrategic commitmentoption contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Portfolio theory (91G10)

Related Items

Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment

Cites Work

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