Relaxing competition through speculation: committing to a negative supply slope
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Publication:900421
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.06.004zbMATH Open1330.91174OpenAlexW2106980617MaRDI QIDQ900421FDOQ900421
Authors: Pär Holmberg, Bert Willems
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1252.pdf
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Cited In (3)
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