Relaxing competition through speculation: committing to a negative supply slope
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 699423 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3222151 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Supply function equilibrium in electricity spot markets with contracts and price caps
- When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory
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