Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants

DOI10.1007/S00712-008-0047-6zbMATH Open1166.91013OpenAlexW2021504129MaRDI QIDQ1028682FDOQ1028682

Authors: Jeong-Yoo Kim 

Publication date: 6 July 2009

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0047-6

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 8780

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Signal jamming in pretrial negotiation with multiple defendants

Cited In (4)

• Plea bargaining: on the selection of jury trials
• Accomplice plea bargains in the presence of costly juror effort
• Bargaining with asymmetric information: an empirical study of plea negotiations
• Plea bargaining when juror effort is costly

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