Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players
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Publication:776439
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2004.07.019zbMATH Open1442.91012arXivq-bio/0409026OpenAlexW1627247948WikidataQ51985924 ScholiaQ51985924MaRDI QIDQ776439FDOQ776439
Authors: Jacek Miękisz 
Publication date: 9 July 2020
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant one, where players are averse to risks. We assume that individuals play with randomly chosen opponents (they do not play against average strategies as in the standard replicator dynamics). We show that the long-run behavior of a population depends on its size and the mutation level.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0409026
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Cited In (14)
- Reflective evolution under strategic uncertainty
- Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium
- Stochastic stability in three-player games with time delays
- Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games
- Evolutionary games and matching rules
- Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
- Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
- Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Pairwise comparison dynamics and evolutionary foundations for Nash equilibrium
- Equilibrium strategies in two-sided mate choice problem with age preferences
- Stochastic sampling of interaction partners versus deterministic payoff assignment
- Type of noise defines global attractors in bistable molecular regulatory systems
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