Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2005.04.021MaRDI QIDQ2196888zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Tadeusz Platkowski, Jacek Miękisz

Publication date 3 September 2020

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0703057

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategypopulation dynamicsevolutionary gamesreplicator dynamicsequilibrium selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) 2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Abstract: We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two evolutionarily stable strategies: the efficient one in which the population is in a state with a maximal payoff and the risk-dominant one where players are averse to risk. We show that for a large range of parameters of our dynamics, even if the initial conditions in both habitats are in the basin of attraction of the risk-dominant equilibrium (with respect to the standard replication dynamics without migration), in the long run most individuals play the efficient strategy.

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players
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• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
• Evolutionary game dynamics
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• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
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Cited in

(5)

• Dynamics of populations with changing rates: Generalization of the stable population theory
• Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria
• Issues on strategy-switching dynamics
• Equilibria in systems of interacting structured populations
• Equilibria in structured populations

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