Dynamic consistency and imperfect recall

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0535zbMath0885.90144OpenAlexW1992772026MaRDI QIDQ1366492

Pierpaolo Battigalli

Publication date: 10 September 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4b1e095896cbc81373354dab512c35aa20dc64ad

zbMATH Keywords

perfect recallconstrained time consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (7)

The absent-minded driver's paradox: Synthesis and responses ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Backward induction in games without perfect recall ⋮ On equilibria in games with imperfect recall ⋮ Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: an experimental test of the absentminded driver ``paradox ⋮ Minimum memory for equivalence between \textit{ex ante} optimality and time-consistency ⋮ Dynamic consistency in extensive form decision problems

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• A comment on the absent-minded driver paradox
• The absent-minded driver
• The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Sequential Equilibria
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
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