Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.005zbMath1274.91067MaRDI QIDQ380877

Priscilla T. Y. Man

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000899?np=y

zbMATH Keywords

efficiency; stochastic stability; evolutionary game; secret handshake

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A22: Evolutionary games

Cites Work

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