A bargaining approach to coordination in networks

DOI10.1007/S00182-008-0127-4MaRDI QIDQ956589zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez

Publication date 25 November 2008

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2007-28.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coordinationNash bargaining solutionrisk-dominancestochastic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

Review text

This paper presents a model in which players interact via the formation of costly links and the benefits of bilateral interactions are determined by a stag-hunt game. A novel contribution of this paper is that the fraction of the cost borne by each player involved in a bilateral link is not fixed exogenously, but from bargaining. The model analyses both in a static and in a dynamic setting. Whereas the static game has multiplicity of equilibria, the paper shows that the only one is stochastically stable.

Recommendations

• Stable and efficient bargaining networks
• Network formation and social coordination
• Coalitional bargaining in networks
• Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks
• On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games.

Cites work

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Cited in

(7)

• Stable and efficient bargaining networks
• Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks
• Network externality and the coordination problem
• Bilateral bargaining in networks
• Social coordination and network formation in bipartite networks
• NETWORK FORMATION, COST-SHARING AND ANTI-COORDINATION
• A bargaining game model for measuring performance of two-stage network structures

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