Effects of network characteristics on reaching the payoff-dominant equilibrium in coordination games: a simulation study
DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0144-4zbMATH Open1391.91055DBLPjournals/dga/BuskensS16OpenAlexW2033297257WikidataQ41261139 ScholiaQ41261139MaRDI QIDQ2013311FDOQ2013311
Authors: Vincent Buskens, Chris Snijders 
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0144-4
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- Conventions and local interaction structures: experimental evidence.
- Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: experimental evidence
- Path dependence and learning from neighbors
- Coordination games on dynamical networks
Cited In (7)
- Coordination problems on networks revisited: statics and dynamics
- Forward-looking behavior in hawk-dove games in endogenous networks: experimental evidence
- Network characteristics enabling efficient coordination: a simulation study
- Asymmetric games on networks: towards an Ising-model representation
- Equilibrium characterization of networks under conflicting preferences
- On the relationship between \(p\)-dominance and stochastic stability in network games
- Investigating peer and sorting effects within an adaptive multiplex network model
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