Forward-looking behavior in hawk-dove games in endogenous networks: experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.12.003MaRDI QIDQ417665zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Marion Ott

Publication date 14 May 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

network formationhawk-dove gamelocal interactionchicken gameforward-looking playersnetwork experiment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Evolutionary games (91A22) Games involving graphs (91A43) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
• A dynamic model of social network formation
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution
• Experiments with network formation
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• Learning in games by random sampling
• Limited foresight may force cooperation
• Network formation and anti-coordination games
• On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games.
• Partner choice and cooperation in networks. Theory and experimental evidence.
• Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games

Cited in

(2)

• Forward-looking principle in repeated games
• Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games

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