Forward-looking behavior in hawk-dove games in endogenous networks: experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.003zbMath1279.91049OpenAlexW2061380245MaRDI QIDQ417665

Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Marion Ott

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

network formationlocal interactionhawk-dove gamechicken gameforward-looking playersnetwork experiment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Games involving graphs (91A43) Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items

FORWARD-LOOKING PRINCIPLE IN REPEATED GAMES

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