Forward-looking behavior in hawk-dove games in endogenous networks: experimental evidence
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.12.003zbMATH Open1279.91049OpenAlexW2061380245MaRDI QIDQ417665FDOQ417665
Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Marion Ott
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.003
network formationhawk-dove gamelocal interactionchicken gameforward-looking playersnetwork experiment
Applications of graph theory (05C90) Evolutionary games (91A22) Games involving graphs (91A43) Experimental studies (91A90)
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Cited In (2)
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