On the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1893188
DOI10.1007/BF01258199zbMath0829.90151MaRDI QIDQ1893188
Publication date: 27 July 1995
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Game theory (91A99) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- The chain store paradox
- Agreeing to disagree
- A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
- An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Non-cooperative games
- The Bargaining Problem
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Sequential Equilibria
- Equilibrium in Strategic Interaction: The Contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- The Logic of Animal Conflict
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
This page was built for publication: On the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten
