Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games
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Cites work
- An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- Cooperation, secret handshakes, and imitation in the prisoners' dilemma
- Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
- Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
- Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3826915 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3228304 (Why is no real title available?)
- Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations
- On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Where strategic and evolutionary stability depart -- a study of minimal diversity games
Cited in
(7)- Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games
- Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
- Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
- Identifying behaviorally robust strategies for normal form games under varying forms of uncertainty
- A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
- Institutional inertia and institutional change in an expanding normal-form game
- Berge equilibrium in normal form static games: a literature review
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