Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games
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Publication:1376985
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Cites work
- An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
- Aspiration-based reinforcement learning in repeated interaction games: An overview
- Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Case-Based Decision Theory
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- Cooperation and Effective Computability
- Cooperation and bounded recall
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Cited in
(7)- Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame.
- WHEN ASPIRING AND RATIONAL AGENTS STRIVE TO COORDINATE
- Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective
- Satisficing games
- Experimental evidence on case-based decision theory
- Numerical analysis of a reinforcement learning model with the dynamic aspiration level in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Evolving aspirations and cooperation
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