Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games

DOI10.1007/S001820050045MaRDI QIDQ1376985zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Amit I. Pazgal

Publication date 1 February 1998

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1126.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mutual interests gamessatisficing decision makers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Satisfying and optimality in \(2\times 2\) common interest games
• Evolving aspirations and cooperation
• Satisficing games

Cites work

• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
• Aspiration-based reinforcement learning in repeated interaction games: An overview
• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Case-Based Decision Theory
• Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
• Cooperation and Effective Computability
• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Path dependence and learning from neighbors
• Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata

Cited in

(7)

• Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame.
• WHEN ASPIRING AND RATIONAL AGENTS STRIVE TO COORDINATE
• Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective
• Satisficing games
• Experimental evidence on case-based decision theory
• Numerical analysis of a reinforcement learning model with the dynamic aspiration level in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Evolving aspirations and cooperation

This page was built for publication: Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1376985)