Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games
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Publication:1376985
DOI10.1007/S001820050045zbMATH Open0888.90168OpenAlexW2030550155MaRDI QIDQ1376985FDOQ1376985
Publication date: 1 February 1998
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1126.pdf
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Cites Work
- Case-Based Decision Theory
- Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Cooperation and Effective Computability
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Aspiration-based reinforcement learning in repeated interaction games: An overview
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
- Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
- Path dependence and learning from neighbors
- Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
Cited In (6)
- Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective
- WHEN ASPIRING AND RATIONAL AGENTS STRIVE TO COORDINATE
- Experimental evidence on case-based decision theory
- Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame.
- Satisficing games
- Numerical analysis of a reinforcement learning model with the dynamic aspiration level in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
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