Games with Symmetric Incomplete Information and Asymmetric Computational Resources

DOI10.1142/S0219198917500347zbMath1391.91034OpenAlexW2776897283MaRDI QIDQ4567820

Michael Gavrilovich, Victoria L. Kreps

Publication date: 20 June 2018

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198917500347

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetryfinite automataincomplete informationzero-sum gameposterior belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Unnamed Item ⋮ In memory of Victoria Kreps (3 September 1945--3 March 2021)

Cites Work

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• Continuous-time limit of dynamic games with incomplete information and a more informed player
• Bounded computational capacity equilibrium
• Existence of the uniform value in zero-sum repeated games with a more informed controller
• A guided tour of Chernoff bounds
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• The tail of the hypergeometric distribution
• Introduction to the theory of finite automata. Translated from the Russian. Translation edited by J.C. Shepherdson
• Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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