Bottom-up design of strategic options as finite automata

DOI10.1007/s10287-008-0084-1zbMath1197.90261MaRDI QIDQ601965

Fernando S. Oliveira

Publication date: 29 October 2010

Published in: Computational Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-008-0084-1

zbMATH Keywords

automata; game; strategy; real options

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90B50: Management decision making, including multiple objectives

91G50: Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.)

Related Items

Limitations of learning in automata-based systems

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• The complexity of computing best-response automata in repeated games
• Finite automata equilibria with discounting
• On players with a bounded number of states
• Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
• Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
• Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts.
• Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Strategic Growth Options
• Evaluating Environmental Investments: A Real Options Approach
• Real Options and Product Life Cycles
• Real Options in Leasing: The Effect of Idle Time
• An Economic Model for Evaluating Mining and Manufacturing Ventures with Output Yield Uncertainty
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Valuation and Optimal Operation of Electric Power Plants in Competitive Markets
• On the Complexity of Coordination