The complexity of interacting automata
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Publication:267110
DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0521-7zbMATH Open1388.91051OpenAlexW2195259740MaRDI QIDQ267110FDOQ267110
Authors: Olivier Gossner, P. Hernández, Ron Peretz
Publication date: 8 April 2016
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65026/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_repository_Content_Gossner%2C%20O_Complexity%20of%20interacting%20automata_Gossner_Complexity%20of%20interacting%20automata_2016.pdf
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Cited In (4)
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