Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.08.004zbMath1311.91027OpenAlexW1992774490MaRDI QIDQ2345207

Gilad Bavly, Abraham Neyman

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfinite automataequilibrium payoffsfolk theorembounded recallconcealed correlation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

The complexity of interacting automata ⋮ Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory ⋮ The strategic value of recall ⋮ Playing off-line games with bounded rationality ⋮ The truth behind the myth of the folk theorem

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Correlation through bounded recall strategies
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
• Infinite histories and steady orbits in repeated games
• Finitely many players with bounded recall in infinitely repeated games
• Repeated games with finite automata
• Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• On complexity as bounded rationality (extended abstract)
• Optimal Use of Communication Resources
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

This page was built for publication: Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality