Group strategyproof Pareto-stable marriage with indifferences via the generalized assignment game

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_22MaRDI QIDQ681886zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nevzat Onur Domaniç, Chi-Kit Lam, C. G. Plaxton

Publication date 13 February 2018

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.01496

zbMATH Keywords

stable marriagegroup strategyproofnessgeneralized assignment gamePareto-stable matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that is group strategyproof for one side of the market. Our key technique involves modeling the stable marriage market as a generalized assignment game. We also show that our mechanism can be implemented efficiently. These results can be extended to the college admissions problem with indifferences.

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Cited in

(4)

• Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
• Group stability in matching with interdependent values
• Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences
• Mechanisms for the Marriage and the Assignment Game

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