Using turn taking to mitigate coordination and conflict problems in the repeated battle of the sexes game

DOI10.1007/s11238-008-9100-8zbMath1142.91339OpenAlexW2133360573MaRDI QIDQ944233

Sau-Him Paul Lau, Vai-Lam Mui

Publication date: 12 September 2008

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/60156

zbMATH Keywords

turn takingBattle of the Sexes gameconflict mitigatingcoordination enhancing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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