Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6389711
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Cited in
(72)- Optimal substructure of set-valued solutions of normal-form games and coordination
- Learning and sophistication in coordination games
- Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
- An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Experience-weighted attraction learning in coordination games: Probability rules, heterogeneity, and time-variation
- Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
- The variable frame theory of focal points: An experimental study
- Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach
- Strategic similarity and emergent conventions: evidence from similar stag hunt games
- Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games
- Focal points in framed strategic forms
- Coordination and learning with a partial language
- Coordination and private information revelation
- Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining
- Symmetric games revisited
- Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games
- Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Subjective games and equilibria
- Can we rationally learn to coordinate?
- Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games
- Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games
- When learning meets salience
- An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games
- Market coordination under non-equilibrium dynamics
- Observability of partners' past play and cooperation: experimental evidence
- Dynamic coordination via organizational routines
- Noise-induced sustainability of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game
- Conformity and influence
- Interaction patterns and coordination in two population groups: a dynamic perspective
- The value of a coordination game
- A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
- Optimal strategies for selecting coordinators
- Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection
- Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study
- Communication and superior cooperation in two-player normal form games
- Learning continuous and consistent strategy promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game with mixed strategy
- Compromise and coordination: an experimental study
- Decentralized learning from failure
- Coordination via correlation: an experimental study
- The evolution of focal points
- Identification of non-equilibrium beliefs in games of incomplete information using experimental data
- An asymptotic solution of Dresher's guessing game
- WHEN ASPIRING AND RATIONAL AGENTS STRIVE TO COORDINATE
- Rendezvous search when marks are left at the starting points
- Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
- Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
- Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
- Gradual guaranteed coordination in repeated win-lose coordination games
- The emergence of compositional grammars in artificial codes
- Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player
- Rendezvous Search with Revealed Information: Applications to the Line
- Dynamic learning in a two-person experimental game
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Cooperative teaching and learning of actions
- The optimal way to play the most difficult repeated two-player coordination games
- The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: an experimental study
- Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
- Fragile meaning -- an experiment
- Inference in Games Without Equilibrium Restriction: An Application to Restaurant Competition in Opening Hours
- The optimal way to play the most difficult repeated coordination games
- Failing to utilize potentially effective focal points: prominence can stymie coordination on distinct actions
- Meaning in communication games
- A social monitoring mechanism for third-party judges promotes cooperation in evolutionary games
- Dynamic coordination with switching costs
- A learning-efficiency explanation of structure in language
- Economic modeling triggers more efficient planning: An experimental justification
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- Using turn taking to mitigate coordination and conflict problems in the repeated battle of the sexes game
- Learning to be prepared
- Minority voting and long-term decisions
- Information-driven coordination: experimental results with heterogeneous individuals
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