Dynamic coordination with switching costs

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2026.05.014MaRDI QIDQ7345980zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Joe S. Ballard, Luke A. Boosey

Publication date 10 September 2026

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2026.05.014

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• Cognitive Uncertainty
• Coordination and learning with a partial language
• Decentralized learning from failure
• Dynamic coordination via organizational routines
• Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games
• Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games
• Language and the theory of the firm
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• Mixed strategies in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Rendezvous Search: A Personal Perspective
• Spatial dispersion as a dynamic coordination problem
• Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
• Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
• The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: an experimental study
• The Regularity of the Value Function of Repeated Games with Switching Costs
• The theory of search games and rendezvous.

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