On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games (Q2640470)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4187508
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| English | On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4187508 |
Statements
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games (English)
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1991
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We show that any feasible, individually rational payoffs of an infinitely repeated game can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs if the discount factor is close enough to one even if mixed strategies are not observable and public randomizations are not available.
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folk theorem
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subgame perfect equilibrium
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public randomizations
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0.9145135283470154
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0.8721529245376587
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0.826784074306488
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0.8193652033805847
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0.8178079724311829
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