Choice overload, coordination and inequality: three hurdles to the effectiveness of the compensation mechanism?

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0840-9MaRDI QIDQ892860zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Estelle Midler, Charles Figuières, Marc Willinger

Publication date 12 November 2015

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02806611

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• Endogenous transfers in the prisoner's dilemma game: an experimental test of cooperation and coordination
• Evidence on the equivalence of the strategic and extensive form representation of games.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2216492 (Why is no real title available?)
• Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma

Cited in

(3)

• A solution of the externality problem using strategic matching
• Approval mechanism to solve prisoner's dilemma: comparison with Varian's compensation mechanism
• Externalities and compensation: Primeval games and solutions

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• Z-Tree

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