Power indices for multicandidate voting games (Q1087481)

Let N be a finite set of players with cardinality n, and (N,v) a proper simple game. Let R be a finite set of candidates (R\(\subset N)\) with cardinality r. Let P be a partition of N into at most r coalitions, each of which represents the backing for one of the candidates. A candidate is winning if his supporting coalition is winning in the simple game v in partition function form. A player is pivotal if a change in his support for a candidate changes the winning candidate. A player who is never pivotal is a dummy. This paper introduces a power index for the above class of multi- candidate voting games. This power index is based on the count of a player's ordered pivot moves. The main result is that this is the unique power index satisfying the dummy, linearity, and efficiency axioms on the class of voting games.