Subcalculus for set functions and cores of TU games.
From MaRDI portal
Let \((N, v)\) be a measure game in the sense of Aumann and Shapley (1974). This paper establishes a simple but elegant characterization of the core of \((N, v)\), \(\text{core}(v)\), in terms of the superdifferential of \(v\), \(\partial v\): \(\text{core}(v)= \partial v(E)\sqcap\partial v(E^c)\), for any linear set \(E\). Further conditions are given which guarantee the nonemptiness of the core and which guarantee that the core is a singleton.
Recommendations
- Simple games in Łukasiewicz calculus and their cores
- Games for the -calculus
- TU-reduced games and their cores
- Set-valued TU-games
- Cores of cooperative games, superdifferentials of functions, and the Minkowski difference of sets
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7632134
- Subsmooth functions and sets
- Game representations of classes of piecewise definable functions
- A recursive core for partition function form games
- Values and semivalues on subspaces of finite games
Cites work
- A characterization of the core of convex games through Gâteaux derivatives
- A Class of Convex Bodies
- A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion
- A uniqueness theorem for convex-ranged probabilities
- Consistent Bayesian aggregation
- Convex Analysis
- Convex games and extreme points
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Cores of exact games. I
- Cores of Nonatomic Linear Production Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 439380 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3816010 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3465097 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1351867 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1070896 (Why is no real title available?)
- On Harsanyi's utilitarian cardinal welfare theorem
- On the core of linear production games
- Submodular functions and optimization
- The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications
- The core of large differentiable TU games
- Theory of capacities
- Values of Non-Atomic Games
Cited in
(11)- On the cores of scalar measure games
- A characterization of the core of convex games through Gâteaux derivatives
- Laws of large numbers of negatively correlated random variables for capacities
- Ideals of null sets of set functions
- A method for estimating the core of root game
- Classical subjective expected utility
- The core of large differentiable TU games
- A new class of convex games on \(\sigma\)-algebras and the optimal partitioning of measurable spaces
- Characterizing arbitrage-free Choquet pricing
- Cores of non-atomic market games
- The bargaining set of a large game
This page was built for publication: Subcalculus for set functions and cores of TU games.
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1394991)
