The core of large differentiable TU games

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2810MaRDI QIDQ5958893zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Larry G. Epstein, Massimo Marinacci

Publication date 20 March 2002

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2810

zbMATH Keywords

exchange economylarge gamenonatomic game core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

The authors show that for non-atomic TU games under certain conditions, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of the characteristic function \(v\). The computations yield either the core of \(v\) is empty or it consists of a single measure. If the latter case happens, the core measure can be expressed explicitly in terms of the derivatives of \(v\). Then the core theory for a class of non-atomic TU games may be reduced to calculus.

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion
• Convex functions, monotone operators and differentiability
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Cores of exact games. I
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3816010 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• Symmetric upper probabilities
• The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications
• Values and Derivatives
• Values of Non-Atomic Games

Cited in

(7)

• Subcalculus for set functions and cores of TU games.
• Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects.
• A characterization of the core of convex games through Gâteaux derivatives
• The Burkill-Cesari integral on spaces of absolutely continuous games
• DOMAIN EXTENSIONS OF THE ERLANG LOSS FUNCTION: THEIR SCALABILITY AND ITS APPLICATIONS TO COOPERATIVE GAMES
• Preference for knowledge
• A mesh-based notion of differential for TU games

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