Values and Derivatives

DOI10.1287/MOOR.5.4.523MaRDI QIDQ3895263zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Jean-François Mertens

Publication date 1980

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.5.4.523

zbMATH Keywords

derivativesdiagonal formuladifferentiable gamesexistence of valuesinfinitesimal playermarginal contributionnonatomic gamesShapley valuevoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Cited in

(13)

• Power and public goods
• Values and cores of fuzzy games with infinitely many players
• The Shapley value in the non differentiable case
• Large symmetric games are characterized by completeness of the desirability relation
• Value on a class of non-differentiable market games
• The limit-price mechanism.
• The Burkill-Cesari integral on spaces of absolutely continuous games
• On non-atomic weighted majority games
• A characterization of exact non-atomic market games
• The core of large differentiable TU games
• Values of non-atomic vector measure games
• Cores of non-atomic market games
• The bargaining set of a large game

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