MOULIN REDUCTION, V-N REDUCTION AND AXIOMATIZATIONS OF THE DUPLICATE CORE

DOI10.1142/S0217595909002365zbMath1187.91015MaRDI QIDQ5850786

Yu-Hsien Liao

Publication date: 15 January 2010

Published in: Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

multi-choice gamesreduced gamesduplicate core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (1)

Alternative Reductions and Axiomatizations of the Unit-Level-Core

Cites Work

• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Reduced games, consistency, and the core
• Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games
• A new axiomatization of the core of games with transferable utility
• Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies
• Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains
• Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
• An Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Cooperative Fuzzy Games
• Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• A value for multichoice games

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