The core and the Weber set for bicooperative games

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0066-xzbMath1131.91005OpenAlexW1974888171MaRDI QIDQ2458424

J. J. López, N. Jiménez, Julio R. Fernández, Jésus Mario Bilbao

Publication date: 31 October 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0066-x

zbMATH Keywords

bisupermodular games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items

Bisemivalues for bicooperative games ⋮ The selectope for bicooperative games ⋮ Cooperative Game as Non-Additive Measure ⋮ Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues

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