Unique solutions for strategic games. Equilibrium selection based on resistance avoidance
The monograph deals, within the theory of strategic games, with the concept of player's resistance against a proposed solution, given a status quo solution. This concept is a basis for refining the equilibrium concept and then, by procedures similar to those of \textit{J. C. Harsanyi} and \textit{R. Selten} [``A general theory of equilibrium selection in games (1988; Zbl 0693.90098)] involving cell and irreducible games, they define a selection of just one equilibrium for a game. This procedure is called ESBORA (equilibrium selection based on resistance avoidance). The authors also discuss the applications to economic decision problems and social conflict situations as well as possible extensions and modifications of the theory.
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