Dynamic programming approach to discrete time dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with independent and dependent followers
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Publication:2569119
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2004.06.011zbMath1101.91013OpenAlexW2120184307WikidataQ57806871 ScholiaQ57806871MaRDI QIDQ2569119
Masao Fukushima, Pu-Yan Nie, Li-Hua Chen
Publication date: 17 October 2005
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2004.06.011
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Dynamic programming (90C39) Dynamic games (91A25)
Related Items (19)
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