Publication:3809551
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zbMath0659.90027MaRDI QIDQ3809551
Jennifer F. Reinganum, Louis L. Wilde
Publication date: 1986
information transmissionprivate informationgame of incomplete informationtax compliancesequential equilibium solution
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