On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents

DOI10.3934/JDG.2016013MaRDI QIDQ330281zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anastasios Xepapadeas, Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos

Publication date 25 October 2016

Published in Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2016013

zbMATH Keywords

optimizationregulationreplicator dynamicstax evasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Economic dynamics (91B55)

Recommendations

• Evolutionary tax evasion, prospect theory and heterogeneous taxpayers
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6988850
• Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers
• Fighting tax evasion: a cellular automata approach
• Evolution of risk-statuses in one model of tax control

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4079127 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 50791 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3484411 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1424768 (Why is no real title available?)
• Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Game theory evolving. A problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits

Cited in

(11)

• Evolutionary tax evasion, prospect theory and heterogeneous taxpayers
• Fighting tax evasion: a cellular automata approach
• A MULTI-AGENT-BASED APPROACH TO TAX MORALE
• Non-compliant behaviour in public procurement: an evolutionary model with endogenous monitoring
• Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: Integrating Evolutionary Game into the Optimal Control of Government Policy
• Tax evasion dynamics and Zaklan model on opinion-dependent network
• Tax competition, relative performance, and policy imitation
• Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers
• Tax evasion and uncertainty in a dynamic context
• Learning (not) to evade taxes
• Analysis of economic behaviour in evolutionary model of tax control under information diffusion

This page was built for publication: On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q330281)