On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents
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Publication:330281
DOI10.3934/JDG.2016013zbMATH Open1347.91059OpenAlexW2494458442MaRDI QIDQ330281FDOQ330281
Authors: Anastasios Xepapadeas, Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos 
Publication date: 25 October 2016
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2016013
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Cites Work
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- Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
Cited In (10)
- Fighting tax evasion: a cellular automata approach
- Non-compliant behaviour in public procurement: an evolutionary model with endogenous monitoring
- Tax evasion dynamics and Zaklan model on opinion-dependent network
- Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers
- Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: Integrating Evolutionary Game into the Optimal Control of Government Policy
- Tax competition, relative performance, and policy imitation
- Tax evasion and uncertainty in a dynamic context
- Learning (not) to evade taxes
- A MULTI-AGENT-BASED APPROACH TO TAX MORALE
- Evolutionary Tax Evasion, Prospect Theory and Heterogeneous Taxpayers
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