Crime, punishment, and evolution in an adversarial game
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Publication:4594583
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Cites work
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- Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
- The evolution of cooperation through imitation
- Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
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- Crying about a strategic wolf: a theory of crime and warning
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1950766 (Why is no real title available?)
- A dynamic analysis of criminal networks
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