Corruption and forest concessions

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2011.05.007MaRDI QIDQ456418zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gregory S. Amacher, Markku Ollikainen, Erkki Koskela

Publication date 25 October 2012

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.05.007

zbMATH Keywords

briberycorruptiondeforestationconcessionsillegal logging

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• Corruption, political competition and environmental policy
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Cited in

(6)

• Centralized versus Decentralized Control of Forest Use in a Federal Structure with Elite Capture
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• On the gains of committing to inefficiency: Corruption, deforestation and low land productivity in Latin america
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2156298 (Why is no real title available?)
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