Corruption and forest concessions

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2011.05.007zbMATH Open1250.91072OpenAlexW2003647883MaRDI QIDQ456418FDOQ456418

Authors: Gregory S. Amacher, Markku Ollikainen, Erkki Koskela 

Publication date: 25 October 2012

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.05.007

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zbMATH Keywords

briberycorruptiondeforestationconcessionsillegal logging

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Corruption, political competition and environmental policy
• Corruption, trade and resource conversion

Cited In (6)

• Centralized versus Decentralized Control of Forest Use in a Federal Structure with Elite Capture
• On the gains of committing to inefficiency: Corruption, deforestation and low land productivity in Latin america
• Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
• Conservation contracts and political regimes
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Corruption, trade and resource conversion

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