Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0120-zzbMath1282.91073OpenAlexW2045699213MaRDI QIDQ1934569

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0120-z

zbMATH Keywords

experimentnetworkspublic goodsmonitoringcostly punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (6)

On blame and reciprocity: theory and experiments ⋮ Introduction to a Festschrift for Andrew Schotter ⋮ Belief heterogeneity and the restart effect in a public goods game ⋮ The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action ⋮ Self-governance in generalized exchange. A laboratory experiment on the structural embeddedness of peer punishment ⋮ Evolving cooperation in spatial population with punishment by using PSO algorithm

Cites Work

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• Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
• What norms trigger punishment?
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods

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