A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups

DOI10.1007/S10058-008-0058-3zbMATH Open1195.91051OpenAlexW2130519521MaRDI QIDQ839615FDOQ839615

Authors: Stefan Brandauer, Florian Englmaier 

Publication date: 2 September 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp1654.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

contestsrent seekingstrategic delegationpolitical economyarms racesdistributional conflict

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• Contest success functions
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments

Cited In (7)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation
• Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse
• Deontic Logic in Computer Science
• On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior
• The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
• Sharing the effort costs in group contests

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