A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups

DOI10.1007/S10058-008-0058-3MaRDI QIDQ839615zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefan Brandauer, Florian Englmaier

Publication date 2 September 2009

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp1654.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

contestsrent seekingstrategic delegationpolitical economyarms racesdistributional conflict

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior
• Private-information group contests: best-shot competition
• Optimal prize allocations in group contests
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Contests between two groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize

Cites work

• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Contest success functions
• Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.

Cited in

(7)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5066175 (Why is no real title available?)
• In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation
• Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse
• Deontic Logic in Computer Science
• On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior
• The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
• Sharing the effort costs in group contests

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