Difference-form group contests
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Cites work
- A Theoretical Treatment of Indices of Absolute Inequality
- Additive Utility Functions and Linear Engel Curves
- An axiomatic characterization of the Watts poverty index
- Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction
- Biased contests for symmetric players
- Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
- Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
- Efficiency-based measures of inequality
- Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
- Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
- Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: uniqueness and characterization
- Foundations for contest success functions
- Group contest success functions
- Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
- Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link
- Group size and group success in conflicts
- Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts
- Inequalities.
- Inequalities: theory of majorization and its applications
- Inequality and conflict outbreak
- Persuasion as a contest
- Private-information group contests: best-shot competition
- The affectionate society: Does competition for partners promote friendliness?
- The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information
- The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
- Unequal inequalities. I, II
- Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
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