Entitlement and the efficiency-equality trade-off: an experimental study

DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9364-5zbMATH Open1290.91036OpenAlexW2028842431MaRDI QIDQ2015035FDOQ2015035

Kerstin Pull, Manfred Stadler, Agnes Bäker, Werner Güth

Publication date: 18 June 2014

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/172911/9/Entitlement_Theory_and_Decision.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyequalitysatisficingentitlement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Equity versus efficiency? Evidence from three-person generosity experiments
• An experimental study of the generosity game
• More is better, but fair is fair: Tipping in dictator and ultimatum games
• The Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods
• Equity, efficiency and evolutionary stability in bargaining games with joint production

Cited In (1)

• Rawlsian altruism with perfect discrimination leads to social efficiency

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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