Limit Pricing when the Potential Entrant is Uncertain of its Cost Function

DOI10.2307/1913161MaRDI QIDQ3714854zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joseph E. jun. Harrington

Publication date 1986

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1913161

zbMATH Keywords

limit pricingpotential entrant

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cited in

(14)

• Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing
• Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab
• Resource allocation to defensive marketing and manufacturing strategies
• Entry deterrence and limit pricing under asymmetric information about common costs
• Duopoly signal jamming
• Bidding between incumbent and entrant
• Entry and espionage with noisy signals
• The limit pricing strategy and foreign market entry
• Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination
• Pricing and entry strategies for competitive firms with optimistic entrant
• Committed versus contingent pricing under cost uncertainty
• Signal-jamming in the frequency domain
• The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example
• Entry under uncertainty: limit and most-favored-customer pricing

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