Commitment and entry-deterrence in a model of duopoly

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90195-8zbMATH Open1273.91203OpenAlexW2001256871MaRDI QIDQ375116FDOQ375116

Kaushik Basu, Nirvikar Singh

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90195-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (7)

• Commitment and price competition in a dynamic differentiated-product duopoly
• A theory of entry dissuasion
• Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach
• Commitment, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Commitment to a strategy of uniform pricing in a two-period duopoly with switching costs
• Dynamic entry deterrence in the UK pathology services market
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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