Commitment and entry-deterrence in a model of duopoly

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90195-8MaRDI QIDQ375116zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kaushik Basu, Nirvikar Singh

Publication date 24 October 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90195-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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(10)

• Commitment and price competition in a dynamic differentiated-product duopoly
• A theory of entry dissuasion
• Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach
• Commitment, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Commitment to a strategy of uniform pricing in a two-period duopoly with switching costs
• Excess capacity and effectiveness of policy interventions: evidence from the cement industry
• Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
• Dynamic entry deterrence in the UK pathology services market
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• The effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies

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