Commitment and entry-deterrence in a model of duopoly
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Publication:375116
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90195-8zbMATH Open1273.91203OpenAlexW2001256871MaRDI QIDQ375116FDOQ375116
Authors: Kaushik Basu, Nirvikar Singh 
Publication date: 24 October 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90195-8
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Cited In (9)
- Commitment and price competition in a dynamic differentiated-product duopoly
- A theory of entry dissuasion
- Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach
- Commitment, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Commitment to a strategy of uniform pricing in a two-period duopoly with switching costs
- Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
- Dynamic entry deterrence in the UK pathology services market
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies
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