Dynamic entry deterrence in the UK pathology services market

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(97)00237-3MaRDI QIDQ1291741zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors K. Appert

Publication date 22 February 2001

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(97)00237-3

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycompetitiondecision support systemshealth services

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Case-oriented studies in operations research (90B90)

Recommendations

• Entry deterrence and hidden competition
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• Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
• The effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies
• Commitment and entry-deterrence in a model of duopoly

Cites work

• A Dynamic Model of Entry Deterrence
• Dynamic entry deterrence in the UK pathology services market
• Optimal capital accumulation and durable goods production
• The chain store paradox

Cited in

(5)

• Market share in a post-entry game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1944104 (Why is no real title available?)
• Strategic wholesale pricing in a supply chain with a potential entrant
• Dynamic entry deterrence in the UK pathology services market
• Pricing and entry strategies for competitive firms with optimistic entrant

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