Strategic pricing and entry deterrence under price-cap regulation

DOI10.1007/BF01231351zbMATH Open1014.91027MaRDI QIDQ698222FDOQ698222

Authors: Alberto Iozzi 

Publication date: 2001

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

entry deterrenceprice-cap regulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites Work

• Sur la gestion des Monopoles Publics astreints a l'equilibre budgetaire
• Privatization, price regulation, and market entry. An asymmetric multistage duopoly model

Cited In (10)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Privatization, price regulation, and market entry. An asymmetric multistage duopoly model
• Price cap regulation of a dominant firm facing competition
• Business value and risk in the presence of price controls: an option-based analysis of margin squeeze rules in the telecommunications industry
• Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination
• Price caps, oligopoly, and entry
• Natural monopoly and differential pricing
• Dynamic entry deterrence in the UK pathology services market
• Ownership and pricing response to entry
• Promoting entry and efficiency via reserve prices

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