Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring

DOI10.2307/2298077MaRDI QIDQ4883969zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

Publication date 13 October 1996

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2298077

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic contracting modelmyopic firm behaviourprofitable long-term projectsrenegotiation-proof contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• Robust contracting and corporate-termism
• Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors
• On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information

Cited in

(9)

• Retained earnings, interest rates and lending relationship
• Myopic Investment Decisions and Competitive Labor Markets
• Monitoring, Implicit Contracting, and the Lack of Permanence of Leveraged Buyouts
• Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts
• An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
• Conditions for rational investment short-termism
• Informational benefits of managerial myopia
• Investment and financing decisions under optimal long-term contracting
• Robust contracting and corporate-termism

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