Investment and financing decisions under optimal long-term contracting
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Publication:5367928
Recommendations
- The interaction of the productivity shocks with the agency problem and investment of the company
- Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring
- A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7295776
Cited in
(6)- Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
- Leveraged investments and agency conflicts when cash flows are mean reverting
- The interaction of debt financing, cash grants and the optimal investment policy under uncertainty
- Internal financing, managerial compensation and multiple tasks
- The interaction of the productivity shocks with the agency problem and investment of the company
- Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
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