Internal financing, managerial compensation and multiple tasks

DOI10.1007/S10436-020-00375-ZMaRDI QIDQ2022932zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sandro Brusco, Fausto Panunzi

Publication date 3 May 2021

Published in Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-020-00375-z

zbMATH Keywords

capital budgetingcorporate financemechanism designmultitask agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Recommendations

• Internal versus External Capital Markets
• Optimal dynamic capital budgeting
• Investment and financing decisions under optimal long-term contracting
• Endogenous Managerial Incentives and the Optimal Combination of Debt and Dividend Commitments
• Informed headquarters and socialistic internal capital markets

Cites work

• Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation
• Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal-agent problems
• Internal versus External Capital Markets
• Optimal Auction Design

Cited in

(4)

• Endogenous Managerial Incentives and the Optimal Combination of Debt and Dividend Commitments
• Informed headquarters and socialistic internal capital markets
• Optimal dynamic capital budgeting
• Optimal short-termism and liquidity management

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