Myopic Investment Decisions and Competitive Labor Markets

DOI10.2307/2527001MaRDI QIDQ4320060zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tim S. Campbell, Anthony M. Marino

Publication date 15 January 1995

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2527001

zbMATH Keywords

agency problemmyopic investment choicesecond best contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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