Myopic Investment Decisions and Competitive Labor Markets

DOI10.2307/2527001zbMATH Open0812.90029OpenAlexW1991952855MaRDI QIDQ4320060FDOQ4320060

Authors: Tim S. Campbell, Anthony M. Marino 

Publication date: 15 January 1995

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2527001

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zbMATH Keywords

agency problemmyopic investment choicesecond best contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cited In (2)

• Managerial Incentives, Investment and Aggregate Implications: Scale Effects
• Speculative bubbles and talent misallocation

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