Commitment and partial naïveté: early withdrawal penalties on retirement accounts

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2023.102844MaRDI QIDQ6100489zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Torben M. Andersen, Joydeep Bhattacharya, Pan Liu

Publication date 22 June 2023

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102844

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentpartial naïvetépresent-biasretirement accounts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Portfolio theory (91G10)

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Cites work

• A theory of personal budgeting
• Choice and procrastination
• Commitment contracts
• Commitment vs. Flexibility
• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
• Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
• On myopia as rationale for social security
• Present-bias, procrastination and deadlines in a field experiment
• Procrastination, self-imposed deadlines and other commitment devices

Cited in

(1)

• Present-biased preferences and the effect of illiquid assets

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