On myopia as rationale for social security

DOI10.1007/S00199-010-0528-ZMaRDI QIDQ535173zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Torben M. Andersen, Joydeep Bhattacharya

Publication date 11 May 2011

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/p1762-2008-08-29.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

myopiasocial securitypensionsdynamic efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic dynamics (91B55) Welfare economics (91B15)

Recommendations

• Optimal taxes and pensions with myopic agents
• Social security and risk sharing
• A positive theory of social security
• Labor supply and the optimality of social security
• A life cycle analysis of social security

Cites work

• A theory of reference-dependent behavior
• Existence of steady-state equilibrium in an overlapping-generations model with production
• Optimum Social Security in a Life-Cycle Growth Model
• Unfunded pensions and endogenous labor supply

Cited in

(11)

• Optimal education policies under endogenous borrowing constraints
• The political intergenerational welfare state
• Pension system design: roles and interdependencies of tax-financed and funded pensions
• Optimal taxes and pensions with myopic agents
• Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts?
• Unfunded pensions and endogenous labor supply
• Commitment and partial naïveté: early withdrawal penalties on retirement accounts
• Severance savings accounts and life-cycle savings
• The macroeconomic implications of deficit financing under present bias
• Time-inconsistent preferences and time-inconsistent policies
• Rational overconfidence and social security: subjective beliefs, objective welfare

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