Recommendations
Cites work
Cited in
(11)- Optimal education policies under endogenous borrowing constraints
- The political intergenerational welfare state
- Pension system design: roles and interdependencies of tax-financed and funded pensions
- Optimal taxes and pensions with myopic agents
- Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts?
- Unfunded pensions and endogenous labor supply
- Commitment and partial naïveté: early withdrawal penalties on retirement accounts
- Severance savings accounts and life-cycle savings
- The macroeconomic implications of deficit financing under present bias
- Time-inconsistent preferences and time-inconsistent policies
- Rational overconfidence and social security: subjective beliefs, objective welfare
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